**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

**Electronic Communication**

Title: Interview of Igor Danchenko Date: 02/09/2017

Synopsis: Interview of Igor Danchenko. Danchenko was interviewed for three days, this is a consolidated write-up of the interview.

Case ID #: \*\*\*\* Crossfire Hurricane; FARA – Russia; SIA

 \*\*\*\* \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* Dragon\*\*\*\*\*\* FARA – Russia; SIA

 \*\*\*\* Crossfire Fury; FARA – Russia; SIA

Full Investigation Initiated: 07/31/2016

\*\*\*\* During the course of three days, Igor Danchenko was interviewed in the FBI’s Washington Field Office (WFO) by FBI personnel along with attorneys from the US Department of Justice, National Security Division. Danchenko was accompanied by his attorney \*\*\*\*. Below is a consolidated write-up of the three-day interviews.

**24 January 2017 (1330-1700)**

**FBI Washington Field Office Interview Room**

**Present:**

**Igor Danchenko, interviewee**

**\*\*\*\*, interviewee’s attorney**

**\*\*\*\*, FBI Special Agent Somma**

**\*\*\*\*, FBI Supervisory Intelligence Analyst Auten**

**David Laufman, Chief, National Security Division, US Department of Justice**

1. **Danchenko’s Background**

(U//FOUO) Danchenko was born in the **\*\*\*\*** city **\*\*\*\*** on **\*\*\*\***. He describes his family as **\*\*\*\*** which included **\*\*\*\*** and **\*\*\*\***. Danchenko completed his high school course in **\*\*\*\*** in **\*\*\*\***. He indicated that his **\*\*\*\*** is probably tied

to the fact that **\*\*\*\*** was a **\*\*\*\*** city. During his high school years, he traveled to the **\*\*\*\*** for **\*\*\*\*** and was also an **\*\*\*\***. **\*\*\*\***, he attended a high school in **\*\*\*\***. In **\*\*\*\***, he also spent some weeks in **\*\*\*\*** which at that time was **\*\*\*\***.”

(U//FOUO) For university, Danchenko attended **\*\*\*\*** between **\*\*\*\***, at which time he graduated with a degree **\*\*\*\***. Danchenko began work during and after college with a number of Russian **\*\*\*\***. He worked for **\*\*\*\*** (**\*\*\*\***), **\*\*\*\***. While with **\*\*\*\***, he made friends with a number of people in the field of **\*\*\*\***. He was also employed by a **\*\*\*\*** company, **\*\*\*\***, during which time he traveled **\*\*\*\*** . Also, during and immediately after his time at **\*\*\*\***, he traveled **\*\*\*\*** with an **\*\*\*\*** and served as a facilitator. The **\*\*\*\*** is associated with the Library of Congress, and during **\*\*\*\***, he assisted and traveled with the delegation **\*\*\*\*** and other cities in the **\*\*\*\***.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko’s desire had always been to obtain a graduate degree in the United States. He applied to a number of schools, and received the best – and one of the only – offers from the **\*\*\*\***. He said that his choice of **\*\*\*\*** didn’t involve **\*\*\*\***, but it just happened that the school gave him a full fellowship for his **\*\*\*\*** studies in **\*\*\*\***. He graduated from **\*\*\*\*** and wanted to stay and work in the **\*\*\*\***, with the hope of getting his Ph.D. He eventually was accepted not to a **\*\*\*\***, but to **\*\*\*\***

**\*\*\*\*** program with a focus on **\*\*\*\*** and **\*\*\*\*** (as he described it, “**\*\*\*\***”). During and after his time at **\*\*\*\***, Danchenko worked at the **\*\*\*\*** in varying ranks - **\*\*\*\***; **\*\*\*\***. He worked on research projects for **\*\*\*\*** and **\*\*\*\***. [*ANALYST NOTE: Later in the debriefing, Danchenko’s attorney asked if we’d all heard about Danchenko’s work on uncovering* ***\*\*\*\*****. We indicated that we had, and that it was our understanding that he had done that work with* ***\*\*\*\*****. Danchenko confirmed that*.]

(U//FOUO) Danchenko explained that he soon hit a glass ceiling at **\*\*\*\*** because of his **\*\*\*\*** and his lack of a **\*\*\*\***. At that time, he was also **\*\*\*\*** **\*\*\*\***, who was **\*\*\*\*** and was noted as on his **\*\*\*\***. He left **\*\*\*\*** circa **\*\*\*\***, stayed **\*\*\*\*** in **\*\*\*\*** and began to try his hand at independent consulting. For a time, he did various analytical pieces on **\*\*\*\*** with **\*\*\*\***. In time, some of the work moved into the area of due diligence and business intelligence. Danchenko says that he saw opportunities to use his existing network of friends and colleagues in the United States and Russia – e.g. high school **\*\*\*\***; **\*\*\*\***, **\*\*\*\***, **\*\*\*\***. In **\*\*\*\***, he began work for **\*\*\*\***, again doing research and analysis and due diligence work. At **\*\*\*\***, he served as the **\*\*\*\***, which meant that he directed others in doing business intelligence on various topics/subregions, including **\*\*\*\***. He helped analysts under him figure out how to best handle assignments and talk to clients. He also put together weekly, bi-weekly and monthly reports. Danchenko worked for

**\*\*\*\*** through the summer of **\*\*\*\***, at which time **\*\*\*\*** parent company went bankrupt and **\*\*\*\***.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko described his travel to **\*\*\*\*** up through the period as sporadic and personal. He took a trip back to **\*\*\*\*** during **\*\*\*\*** in order to do research for his **\*\*\*\***. The rest of his trips **\*\*\*\*** during this time – which he said took place every **\*\*\*\*** years or so – were centered on **\*\*\*\***, **\*\*\*\*** and celebrating New Year’s.

1. **Danchenko’s Early Relationship and Eventual Employment with Christopher Steele and Orbis Business Intelligence**

(U//FOUO) Danchenko first met Christopher Steele [hereafter Steele] in the mid-to-late **\*\*\*\***. The introduction was brokered through **\*\*\*\***, who, according to Danchenko, **\*\*\*\*** with Steele’s **\*\*\*\***. In the period that Danchenko was looking for work, following the end of his tenure at **\*\*\*\***, **\*\*\*\*** was involved with helping Danchenko to try and find new employment opportunities. **\*\*\*\*** found out that Steele was setting up a new business, Orbis, and that he was on the lookout for analytical help. **\*\*\*\*** suggested that Danchenko might consider looking at Orbis, and helped to broker an email introduction to Steele. According to Danchenko this was just one of the companies **\*\*\*\*** helped to broker introductions.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko met in person with Steele at a Starbucks in **\*\*\*\***. They met for about an hour in the coffee shop, and then went to Steele’s hotel, where they sat and talked for about 30 minutes. Danchenko said that they really didn’t talk in-depth about Danchenko’s background, but rather discussed Danchenko’s basic biographical

information, his contacts/network, and his connections in **\*\*\*\***. No work was offered at this time, but Steele said that “If we [Orbis] get a project, we’ll get in touch.”

(U//FOUO) In circa **\*\*\*\***, Steele contacted Danchenko and asked that he fulfill a project – an open source analysis of what Danchenko thought were three of the best sectors of low-risk investment **\*\*\*\***. Danchenko wrote a few pages, highlighting risks and opportunities, and submitted them to Steele. Danchenko still wasn’t sure at this time what Orbis’ primary focus was – he (Danchenko) said that it was not clear if it was about due diligence and business intelligence. For the short risk assessment report, Danchenko was paid a few hundred dollars, direct-deposited into his account. He said he was very appreciative of this, because he didn’t really have an income at this time.

(U//FOUO) Later in **\*\*\*\***, Steele told him that he had read and liked his risk assessment and Danchenko was formally brought on board with Orbis. He signed a confidentiality agreement, which he didn’t think twice about signing because it was fairly standard – he compared it to the types of paperwork he signed at **\*\*\*\***, including sexual harassment policy, etc. All contact with Steele was being done at this time via email and Skype. Danchenko signed the confidentiality agreement, scanned it, and sent it back to Steele via email. Danchenko did not sign a “non-compete” agreement with Orbis, and he described his work with Orbis initially as “**\*\*\*\*** work” and “**\*\*\*\***projects” as he was still with **\*\*\*\***. Orbis was just part of his overall portfolio at this time.

(U//FOUO) Initially, his work with Orbis was in the open source sphere.

He did not have any visibility into Orbis’ end clients. Danchenko commented that during his time with Orbis, he was always been trying to understand the tangible results of his work – Danchenko’s attorney added that his client, “never asked, and was never told [about final clients].” The project requirements were always kept vague with few concrete parameters – e.g. “Can you do some checking on this?” Also, initially with Orbis, his sole contact was with Steele He was in email and Skype communication with Steele and was informally introduced to other Orbis employees during Skype calls, but Danchenko was never flown out to the UK to meet with Steele and his Orbis team.

(U//FOUO) In **\*\*\*\***, Danchenko had his first Orbis-financed trip **\*\*\*\***. His specific project involved inquiries about a **\*\*\*\*** [which Danchenko did not name] and the company’s owner, which he described as a former Russian senator and Duma deputy. It was a due diligence assignment, and he was meant to look for company/management links to organized crime and Russia’s regional and federal power structures. For this, he was wired $3,000. He used $1,500 to purchase a round-trip ticket, and $1,500 to cover expenses for the trip. He used his existing contacts and daisy-chained from them to try to identify others with relevant information. For example, Danchenko explained, he would use pre-existing contacts to find out if anyone he knew had worked in public relations or advertising for a **\*\*\*\***. Danchenko did not pay anyone for information, and reported back to Steele verbally either via Skype or in-person in London.

(U//FOUO) In circa **\*\*\*\***, Danchenko traveled for the **\*\*\*\*** in his life **\*\*\*\***. It was both a personal trip and a business trip. Orbis paid for the trip, and during his time in the UK, Danchenko met Steele – “for the second or third time in my life” – and

also introduced to other Orbis employees, including **\*\*\*\*** and **\*\*\*\***, about whom Danchenko described as an analyst who had graduated from an English university. Danchenko described the time with Orbis as “general meetings, [pitching] potential projects, and discussing general rumors about Putin and Putin’s new third term as president. There was talk about what the “biggest rumors” or the “biggest compromising info” regarding the Russian government was.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko could not remember exactly when he had first learned that Steele [was a former intelligence officer]. He thought it was around 2012 or 2013. He couldn’t remember if someone told him that fact, someone mentioned it, or if it was just “common knowledge” that he had picked up over time. [*ANALYST NOTE: In discussing his knowledge of Steele’s former intelligence service employment, Danchenko remarked that he didn’t really care to know such things and wanted to “stay out of the government’s business” – to which his attorney said, “Well, you haven’t done a very good job of that.”]*

(U//FOUO) Danchenko continued to work on a number of projects for Orbis on all kinds of subjects, including Russian leadership, banking, and the **\*\*\*\***. He would provide reports every month or every other month.

(U//FOUO) Through Danchenko, **\*\*\*\*** and Orbis were in a contractual relationship, and it was Danchenko’s hope that **\*\*\*\*** would result in **\*\*\*\*** and Danchenko’s eventual ability to get a security clearance and set up his own business. However, with the **\*\*\*\*** bankruptcy of **\*\*\*\*** parent company – and the subsequent closing of **\*\*\*\*** itself – Danchenko found himself in a difficult situation, **\*\*\*\***. He

needed an entity to **\*\*\*\*** - and as Orbis couldn’t do it [as Danchenko’s attorney put it, because Orbis was a British company] – Danchenko went to a friend, **\*\*\*\*** who is the **\*\*\*\***. **\*\*\*\*** was receptive about bringing Danchenko on board with **\*\*\*\*** but said that they could only help him out if he had a source of income. At that point, Danchenko introduced Steele and **\*\*\*\*** and a formal arrangement was set up between Orbis and **\*\*\*\***. **\*\*\*\*** served as a “contract vehicle” through which Danchenko would be paid a monthly salary for his work for Orbis. Danchenko became a salaried employee of **\*\*\*\*** and **\*\*\*\*** **\*\*\*\*** his **\*\*\*\***. Out of the approximately **\*\*\*\*** people employed at **\*\*\*\*** Danchenko was the only one – as far as he knows – who was working solely for Orbis, and Danchenko believes that only **\*\*\*\*** knows of his work for Orbis. Prior to this arrangement, the only paperwork tie between Danchenko and Orbis was through the banking/wire transactions, but after this, the only regular paperwork tie would be between Danchenko and **\*\*\*\***. Danchenko said that he received after deductions, etc. about **\*\*\*\*** in cash/month. [*ANALYST NOTE: Danchenko also gave a figure of* ***\*\*\*\*****/month, but it is not clear how much* ***\*\*\*\**** *charges Orbis for Danchenko’s services, which would indicate the profit* ***\*\*\*\**** *makes from Danchenko’s Orbis-related work*.] Since Danchenko is on a monthly salary with **\*\*\*\***, Steele can reach out directly, give assignments and direct his (Danchenko’s) travel.

1. **Danchenko Policies and Procedures While Traveling Abroad for Orbis; Danchenko Contacts with Russian Intelligence and Security Services**

(U//FOUO) Danchenko was asked how he “covers” his queries with his

sources. He typically tells his sources that he is working on a research project or an analytical product. He was also asked if there were friends, associates and/or sources who knew that he was collecting information for Orbis. He said “yes and no,” and explained that some of his closer friends understand that he works in the area of due diligence and business intelligence. Many of them think that he is doing projects for entities like **\*\*\*\***, the **\*\*\*\***, or think tanks **\*\*\*\***. They don’t know that he works for Orbis, as he signed a non-disclosure agreement and was told not to talk about the company. He has never mentioned Chris Steele or Orbis to his friends and associates. He emphasized that “you [the FBI] are the first people he’s told.”

(U//FOUO) Danchenko was asked if he takes notes on the information he is collecting from his sources, or if he keeps any kind of records. He was told by Steele that it is a security risk to take notes; he hasn’t kept notes or electronic records. He occasionally makes scribbles and/or chicken scratch notes here and there, but gives verbal debriefs in **\*\*\*\*** following his trips **\*\*\*\***. Altogether, with respect to the election-related reporting, he had three trips **\*\*\*\***. **\*\*\*\***. He also had one additional United Kingdom trip. While **\*\*\*\***, he was primarily **\*\*\*\***.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko had no communications with Steele while **\*\*\*\***. He was always advised by Steele that they were not to have communications, or to minimize communications, saving them for only emergency or urgent matters.

(U//FOUO) During the conversation about SOURCE 1 [see below], Danchenko was asked if Orbis had ever asked him to broker direct contact with one of his (Danchenko’s) sources, or whether Orbis was comfortable keeping Danchenko as the intermediary between the sources and the company. Danchenko indicated that Orbis has always kept him (Danchenko) as the intermediary.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko indicated that, to his knowledge, he has not had any contacts with the Russian intelligence or security services. [*ANALYST NOTE: His attorney emphasized “to his knowledge” during this part of the discussion.*] Danchenko said that he had contacts with Russian government officials **\*\*\*\***, as he said, in the **\*\*\*\*** - but he denied any contact – again, “as far as he (Danchenko) knew,” with anyone in the SVR, GRU or FSB.

1. **Danchenko’s Initial US Election-Related Assignments for Orbis**

(U//FOUO) Around March 2016, Danchenko and Chris Steele had a voice conversation during which time Steele asked Danchenko to see what he (Danchenko) could find out about Paul Manafort, including his reputation in the United States, his connections to the Yanukovich regime in Ukraine, and any corruption ties. He related some of Steele’s corruption-related questions – “Do you know [about] Manafort? Find out about Manafort’s dealings with Ukraine, his dealings with other countries, and any corrupt schemes [to which Manafort is connected].” Danchenko said that he was “clueless” about who Manafort was, and that this was a “strange task” to have been given. It was strange because Danchenko had not done US-related projects for Orbis before, and he was a bit uncomfortable working on a topic dealing with **\*\*\*\***. Steele did not give him a tight deadline on this assignment. At this

point, Danchenko was on salary with Orbis through **\*\*\*\***, and there was no difference in financial renumeration for this assignment. He had no inclinations as to why, or for whom, Steele was asking about Manafort. Danchenko carefully asked around some of his **\*\*\*\*** friends. He said he may have asked friends and contacts in Russia, but he couldn’t remember off-hand. He added that, for this topic, his friends and contacts in Russia couldn’t say very much because they were “too far removed” from the matter. Danchenko recalled that he was able to find articles about Manafort’s ties to Ukraine and the Philippines. Danchenko reported some of the findings on this assignment to Steee using **\*\*\*\***, a secure messenger app, which he has used, in addition to Skype, for communicating with Steele.

(U//FOUO) In the last week of **\*\*\*\***, Danchenko took an Orbis-related trip **\*\*\*\***. He was working primarily on a business intelligence matter – a**\*\*\*\***. For this trip, Chris also asked Danchenko to look for information dealing with the US presidential election, including compromising materials on Donald Trump. Danchenko said he could not remember if Steele had asked Danchenko to ask around for compromising materials on just Trump, or Trump and Hillary Clinton – at which point Danchenko’s attorney indicated that Danchenko had told him [the attorney] previously that it had been both presidential candidates. The request did not shock Danchenko, but it was – again – outside the normal scope of work and it wasn’t completely comfortable for him. Like the Manafort assignment, it was not really a Russia-specific job and it involved, indirectly, his **\*\*\*\***.” He was nervous and cautious when asking around about the topic in Russia, but he felt like he had to report something back to Steele about it. Steele did not place any higher priority on the

election-related requirements; it was still a side effort to the **\*\*\*\***. It was, to Danchenko, “unpleasant,” but he made inquiries and had a few election-related conversations, but it wasn’t the main focus of his trip.

1. **Danchenko’s Contacts on his \*\*\*\* Trip \*\*\*\***

(U//FOUO) **SOURCE 2**

(U//FOUO) SOURCE 2 is in **\*\*\*\***, probably around **\*\*\*\***. Danchenko has known SOURCE 2 for about **\*\*\*\*** years. They first met at a **\*\*\*\***, **\*\*\*\***. They were together at the **\*\*\*\*** and struck it off well. He is now a good friend. SOURCE 2 comes from a **\*\*\*\*** and, more distantly, **\*\*\*\***. SOURCE 2 himself is a **\*\*\*\***, and a **\*\*\*\***. He runs his own Facebook page, and has served as **\*\*\*\*** of two different **\*\*\*\***. He is **\*\*\*\***. He has been Danchenko’s source of information regarding economic sanctions, and actions taken by **\*\*\*\*** - a friend of SOURCE 2 knows a **\*\*\*\*** handling the company’s public and governmental relations (PR/GR). Another of SOURCE 2’s close friends works as a **\*\*\*\***. SOURCE 2 is an avid **\*\*\*\***. He often tries to monetize his relationship with Danchenko, suggesting that the two of them should try and do projects together for money. SOURCE 2 told Danchenko that there was compromising material on Trump.

(U//FOUO) **SOURCE 3**

(U//FOUO) SOURCE 3 was born in **\*\*\*\***. She is a close, personal friend to Danchenko. She is originally from **\*\*\*\***, and then **\*\*\*\***. They have been friends since [the equivalent of] the 8th grade **\*\*\*\*** - **\*\*\*\***. Upon reflection, Danchenko corrected himself indicating that she had been a year behind him in the **\*\*\*\***. She moved **\*\*\*\*** in **\*\*\*\***, where she worked in the **\*\*\*\*** field. She did a bit of **\*\*\*\***, worked in **\*\*\*\***, and also **\*\*\*\***. She went to the **\*\*\*\***. [*ANALYST NOTE: what is now called* **\*\*\*\*]**, where she took **\*\*\*\*** as her first language, **\*\*\*\*** as her second language, and also studied **\*\*\*\***. Danchenko added that SOURCE 3’s family has a vacation home in **\*\*\*\***. SOURCE 3 worked for **\*\*\*\***, **\*\*\*\***. In the **\*\*\*\***, SOURCE 3 moved to **\*\*\*\***, where she served as **\*\*\*\***. For about a year now, SOURCE 3 has lived in **\*\*\*\***. Danchenko said that he was not exactly sure what she does now in **\*\*\*\***, but she has done **\*\*\*\*** and works **\*\*\*\*** a Russian **\*\*\*\***.

(U//FOUO) SOURCE 3 and Danchenko have remained friends for many years. Her **\*\*\*\*** helped him financially years ago – he would borrow money from her **\*\*\*\***, and her **\*\*\*\*** wouldn’t ask for repayment. More recently, he has helped out SOURCE 3 financially – probably around **\*\*\*\*** over the last **\*\*\*\*** years.

(U//FOUO) SOURCE 3 has a vast network of people who are employed in the **\*\*\*\***. Through SOURCE 3’s **\*\*\*\***, Danchenko has been able to collect

information for Orbis across a wide range of topics – major Russian firms; Russian state entities, including the Kremlin. SOURCE 3’s “big connection” – though Danchenko emphasized that it is not necessarily her direct contact – is **\*\*\*\***. SOURCE 3 may have met him in person, but she knows a couple of **\*\*\*\*** who have good access to **\*\*\*\*** and upon whom **\*\*\*\*** has relied to get out his own messaging. Danchenko wasn’t sure, but he thought these contacts may include **\*\*\*\*** who Danchenko met while he was at **\*\*\*\*** and who used to head **\*\*\*\***.

(U//FOUO) Through SOURCE 3, Danchenko has also become good friends with the **\*\*\*\***, who was assaulted in Russia for **\*\*\*\***.

(U//FOUO) SOURCE 3 is one of the individuals who knows that Danchenko works for due diligence and business intelligence. [*As an aside at this point, Danchenko insisted that SOURCE 2 probably has a better idea about this than does SOURCE 3 because SOURCE 2 is always trying to monetize his relationship with Danchenko. Danchenko reiterated again to the interviewers that SOURCE 2 will often pitch money-making ideas or projects – “Let’s work together. I (SOURCE 2) can try and get* ***\*\*\*\**** *to answer a question, but I’ll need some money to do it*.”] SOURCE 3 has an understanding that Danchenko is “connected.” In fact, either **\*\*\*\*** morning or **\*\*\*\*** morning, SOURCE 3 reached out to Danchenko and asked him for help in **\*\*\*\*** on how **\*\*\*\*** living in the United States are viewing the Trump administration. She is asking him **\*\*\*\*** by the weekend, probably so she can sell it to a friend in Moscow.

(U//FOUO) SOURCE 3 was one of the key sources for the “Trump dossier.” She is directly quoted at points; however, Danchenko is not sure if she realizes that the questions come from her. Right now, **\*\*\*\***. She is keeping **\*\*\*\*** with her **\*\*\*\***. SOURCE 3 used to work in the country of **\*\*\*\***.

(U//FOUO) **SOURCE 4**

(U//FOUO) SOURCE 4 is a **\*\*\*\***. He is **\*\*\*\***. Danchenko met him while he was on an exchange scholar program at **\*\*\*\*** for about **\*\*\*\*** in **\*\*\*\***. Danchenko spent a lot of time with SOURCE 4 during SOURCE 4’s time in **\*\*\*\***.

(U//FOUO) SOURCE 4 specializes in regional politics, particularly **\*\*\*\***, but also addresses US-Russian relations, US elections, and a host of issues involving US-Russian competition and conflict, including **\*\*\*\*** ).

(U//FOUO) SOURCE 4’s everyday duties as a **\*\*\*\*** vary. One day, he could be **\*\*\*\*** for a visiting **\*\*\*\***; the next day, he could be handling **\*\*\*\***. As Danchenko explained, it would not be uncommon for SOURCE 4 to remark to Danchenko things like, “I just heard such-and-such from someone in the

**\*\*\*\*** **\*\*\*\***,” or “I just heard this from a Deputy Minister,” or “I just overheard such-and-such about an issue.”

(U//FOUO) Danchenko and SOURCE 4 drink heavily together, and SOURCE 4 always looks forward to getting together with SOURCE 4 when Danchenko is in town. Danchenko knows that SOURCE 4 travels to **\*\*\*\***.

(U//FOUO) **SOURCE 1**

(U//FOUO) Danchenko has known SOURCE 1 since late **\*\*\*\***, when SOURCE 1 was part of a **\*\*\*\***. He has visited both **\*\*\*\*** and **\*\*\*\*** as part of **\*\*\*\*** visits to the United States. SOURCE 1 is about **\*\*\*\*** years old and comes from **\*\*\*\***, where he served in city and regional government positions, including **\*\*\*\*** and **\*\*\*\***. Danchenko explained that things did not work out well for SOURCE 1 in **\*\*\*\***, so he moved to **\*\*\*\*** and began working in the **\*\*\*\*** - particularly with respect to **\*\*\*\***. From the **\*\*\*\*** SOURCE 1 worked for **\*\*\*\***. Over the last few years, he had served in the capacity of **\*\*\*\***.

(U//FOUO) SOURCE 1’s background as a former **\*\*\*\*** means that, from a young age, he has been involved in political activities. He’s been in some form of politics since he was a teenager. He is also a **\*\*\*\*** but Danchenko could not recall if it was in economics, political science or philosophy. Danchenko has been talking politics with SOURCE 1 since his (Danchenko’s) days as a **\*\*\*\*** at the **\*\*\*\***. Now, they meet together whenever Danchenko goes to **\*\*\*\***.

(U//FOUO) Orbis knows more about SOURCE 1 because, as a favor to SOURCE 1, Danchenko reached out to Orbis to see if Orbis could help get SOURCE 1 **\*\*\*\*** a scholarship for language courses in the United Kingdom. SOURCE 1 asked Danchenko for assistance, and Danchenko turned to Orbis for help. As part of this, Danchenko explained who SOURCE 1 was, and why he (Danchenko) was asking Orbis for assistance.

(U//FOUO) SOURCE 1 is always trying to get Danchenko to start projects and make money together – Danchenko related how SOURCE 1, like others, is always asking questions like, “Can you get us some projects?” or “Can you get us financing?” or “Let’s do something together dealing with **\*\*\*\***!” Danchenko doesn’t consider this as his source “tasking him” but as simply the normal course and scope of networking in these circles. Danchenko did help SOURCE 1 with an academic book about **\*\*\*\***. He made about **\*\*\*\*** for his assistance with the academic book. For it, Danchenko went to the Library of Congress, performed archival research, and also talked to academics he (Danchenko) knew.”

(U//FOUO) Danchenko knows that SOURCE 1 travels to the **\*\*\*\***.

(U//FOUO) SOURCE 1 has a good relationship with RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. SOURCE 1 considers RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER a good friend, and he (SOURCE 1) hears, from RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, many things about, and from, RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER’s circles. From SOURCE 1’s relationship with RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, Danchenko has been able to collect information of interest to Orbis, including Russian domestic politics and more specialized subjects like **\*\*\*\***. Danchenko understands that SOURCE 1’s relationship with RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER stems from SOURCE 1’s tenure in **\*\*\*\***. There, SOURCE 1 had contacts with the regional Federal Security Service (FSB),

as well as with individuals in the **\*\*\*\*** who were associated with politically-conservative and strongly Russian **\*\*\*\*** circles. It was through these connections that SOURCE 1 was introduced to RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. Danchenko was asked if SOURCE 1 was a devout Orthodox believer – Danchenko did not believe so, but thought that he might have been at one time.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko has never met RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. He’s never been to one of RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER’s \*\*\*\*, and said that he doesn’t believe he’s ever been in the same room as RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

(U//FOUO) **SOURCE 5**

(U//FOUO) SOURCE 5 is an **\*\*\*\***. Danchenko has met her in person, and they are also connected through **\*\*\*\***. They have been friends **\*\*\*\*** for about **\*\*\*\*** years. They have many mutual **\*\*\*\*** friends. She is tied to Russia’s **\*\*\*\***, and she has ties to the **\*\*\*\***, as well as ties to the Russian intelligence and security services. Danchenko remarked that things have become “personal” between SOURCE 5 and **\*\*\*\*** because of stories that have been written [*ANALYST NOTE: This may be a reference to the fact that in* **\*\*\*\***]. The Carter Page-Sechin meeting references in the “Trump dossier” would have been derived from SOURCE 5.

1. **Dossier Report Number 2016/95**

(U//FOUO) The interviewers asked Danchenko to review Report 2016/95. This material was collected during the period where the

election-related theme was still a “side project.” The election-related material became a much more important project in the July-August 2016 period.

(U//FOUO) This report involves reporting from “Source E” – reporting which Danchenko ties, at least in part, to SOURCE 6. Danchenko related the story about his contact with SOURCE 6. In either late June or July 2016 - **\*\*\*\*** - he reached out to USPER, a **\*\*\*\*** journalist for **\*\*\*\***. He asked USPER some of the same questions Orbis had tasked him with regarding Trump’s Russian connections, and USPER put him in contact with another of his (USPER’s) colleagues, USPER 2. USPER said that USPER 2 had SOURCE 6’s contact information, and that SOURCE 6 was someone with whom Danchenko should speak, someone with whom “they” **\*\*\*\*** were talking. There was even talk about Danchenko meeting up with USPER 2 in person, but it did not happen.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko reached out to SOURCE 6 via email twice. He never received a response from the first attempt, but after the second attempt, he received in circa late **\*\*\*\*** 2016 a very strange phone call from a Russian male who he believed to be SOURCE 6, but who never identified himself. The individual on the other end of the call never identified himself. The two of them talked for a bit, and the two of them tentatively agreed to meet in person in US CITY at the end of July. At the end of July, Danchenko traveled with **\*\*\*\*** to US CITY, but the meeting never took place and no one ever called Danchenko back. Altogether, he had only a single phone call with an individual he thought to be SOURCE 6. The call was either a cellular

call, or it was a communication through a phone app. Danchenko will look back at his phone to see if he can get caller information.

1. **Dossier Report Number 2016/94**

(U//FOUO) This report involves the purported Carter Page meeting with Sechin, as well as the purported Carter Page meeting with Igor Divyekin. Danchenko indicated that the sourcing for this report derives from his (Danchenko’s) conversations with SOURCE 5 **\*\*\*\*** and SOURCE 3 **\*\*\*\***.

(U//FOUO) As Danchenko recalls, Carter Page was one of 4-5 names that Steele provided to Danchenko. Carter Page, as Danchenko relates, had his meetings in Moscow in early July 2016 – either the 6th through the 8th, or the 5th through the 9th. SOURCE 5 told Danchenko that she had heard that Carter Page was going to meet with Sechin, and then later, in writing, SOURCE 5 confirmed that the Page-Sechin meeting had actually taken place. Danchenko said that he would confirm the date, time and circumstances under which SOURCE 5 confirmed to him (Danchenko) that the Page-Sechin meeting had taken place. He will check his phone, but he recalls that he received the confirmation from SOURCE 5 via text in September 2016 when he was at **\*\*\*\***. **\*\*\*\*** was able to confirm that the Page-Sechin meeting took place through one of her contacts - **\*\*\*\***. Altogether, Danchenko summarized, SOURCE 5 told him about the Page-Sechin meeting, and then later confirmed via text that the meeting had taken place.

(U//FOUO) SOURCE 5 travels to the **\*\*\*\***

1. **Media Contact/Outreach to Danchenko**

(U//FOUO) Danchenko received two media inquiries on the dossier. One was from a specialized **\*\*\*\*** journal, while the other was from **\*\*\*\***. He has not reponded to either inquiry.

**25 January 2017**

**FBI Washington Field Office Interview Room**

**Present:**

**Igor Danchenko, interviewee**

**\*\*\*\*, interviewee’s attorney**

**\*\*\*\*, FBI Special Agent Somma**

**\*\*\*\*, FBI Supervisory Intelligence Analyst Auten**

**\*\*\*\*, Deputy, National Security Division, US Department of Justice**

1. **Recent Communication by Christopher Steele**

(U//FOUO) Danchenko reported that Christopher Steele had reached out to him today **\*\*\*\***. He has not replied, but is planning to do so either tonight or tomorrow. His plan is to simply say that he has been meeting with his **\*\*\*\***.

1. **Documents**

(U//FOUO) Danchenko brought three documents for the interviewers. The first was the Russian-language text interaction between Danchenko and SOURCE 5 regarding the Sechin-Page meeting in July 2016. The second were copies of **\*\*\*\*** profiles for SOURCE 2, SOURCE 1, SOURCE 3, SOURCE 5, and SOURCE 4, with an added picture of a **\*\*\*\*** belonging to SOURCE 2. The third document was a copied pastiche of a number of profiles, business cards and pictures, which will be explained in further detail below.

(U//FOUO) Regarding Document #1, the text interaction between SOURCE 5 and Danchenko, he explained that the date he had given yesterday was incorrect. The text interchange took place in **\*\*\*\*** versus **\*\*\*\***, and it would have been during Danchenko’s visit to **\*\*\*\*** immediately following his **\*\*\*\*** trip **\*\*\*\***. He was in **\*\*\*\*** when they had the interaction. Interviewers indicated that the Russian initials [ which, transliterated into English would be I.I.S.] stand for Igor Ivanovich Sechin.

(U//FOUO) Regarding Document #2, these are pictures and profiles of the friends and associates in Danchenko’s network discussed the previous day. Danchenko’s attorney balked at the use of the term “network,” stating that the preferred term was “social circle.” One of the interviewers noted that SOURCE 3’s profile shows her as having studied at **\*\*\*\***.

(U//FOUO) Regarding Document #3, the following information was provided:

(U//FOUO) In the upper left hand corner, Danchenko identified **\*\*\*\*** as the head of the Russian **\*\*\*\***. He has never met **\*\*\*\*** and has never had direct interaction with him, but SOURCE 2 and **\*\*\*\*** have direct contact. SOURCE 2 and **\*\*\*\*** are on friendly terms.

(U//FOUO) Underneath **\*\*\*\*** photo is a business card from **\*\*\*\***, noted as Deputy Director, **\*\*\*\***. Underneath that business card is what appears to be a Windows Outlook reference to **\*\*\*\***. **\*\*\*\*** and **\*\*\*\*** work in the same office, and **\*\*\*\*** may actually serve under **\*\*\*\***. **\*\*\*\*** which Danchenko said stood for **\*\*\*\***. It was from **\*\*\*\*** and **\*\*\*\*** that Danchenko heard about the fears and concerns among “[Dmitriy] Medvedev’s people” about what the Kremlin was doing with respect to involvement in the US presidential election. Danchenko remarked how the Russian influence issue was considered an “open secret” and that he was hearing similar stories from other sources – probably SOURCE 3.

(U//FOUO) Next to the Windows Outlook screenshot on **\*\*\*\*** there is a list of pricing with the title, translated from Russian as “collection banknote United States.doc.” Danchenko’s attorney emphasized that he did not believe this represented anything illegal or illicit on the part of his client. Danchenko explained this in reference to SOURCE 2 **\*\*\*\*** and his interest in **\*\*\*\***. During Danchenko’s travel to **\*\*\*\***, he went to **\*\*\*\*** and, while there, withdrew bank notes from

a number of different bank ATMs **\*\*\*\***. Danchenko brought those notes to SOURCE 3, who would exchange the Scottish bank notes for rubles – using the current exchange rate. As he remarked the previous day, SOURCE 2 is an **\*\*\*\*** and has been doing so for decades. The pricing list is a “wish list.” [As an aside, Danchenko identified another of SOURCE 2’s friends, **\*\*\*\***, **\*\*\*\***.]

(U//FOUO) In the upper right hand corner, Danchenko identified RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE. She is currently serving as the head of **\*\*\*\***, which is run by RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE or **\*\*\*\*** [*ANALYST NOTE: This may be a misidentification. The head of* **\*\*\*\***], who in turn is connected with RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE. In her position, RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE has direct access to RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE. Danchenko said that he has not used RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE as a source for the reports, but that they are good friends and that he has known her for at least **\*\*\*\*** years.

1. **RUSSIAN OFFICIAL, RUSSIAN official, Veterans Pension System, and Dossier Report 2016/111, including Paragraph #5**

(U//FOUO) Underneath the picture of RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE is a business card belonging to RUSSIAN OFFICIAL, identified on the card as **\*\*\*\***. Danchenko has known RUSSIAN OFFICIAL for several years - **\*\*\*\***. They were together **\*\*\*\***, during which time Danchenko recalls that he tried to get conversation **\*\*\*\*** started about Ukraine and sanctions.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko first said that he knows that RUSSIAN OFFICIAL has been back in Russia since August 2016, but then thought a bit more and said, “maybe summer 2016.” Danchenko described RUSSIAN OFFICIAL as “not a direct source, but he does appear in the [Trump] dossier.” **\*\*\*\***. According to Danchenko, RUSSIAN OFFICIAL is the only person he (Danchenko) knows **\*\*\*\***. Danchenko believes that **\*\*\*\*** but he isn’t positive about that. He recalls that they had a conversation later in spring 2016 during which time RUSSIAN OFFICIAL said that he (RUSSIAN OFFICIAL) had “put in a word” and wondered if it had helped. They had a 5-10 minute chat [*ANALYST NOTE: It is unclear if it was the same spring 2016 conversation or a later conversation*] during which time RUSSIAN OFFICIAL confided in Danchenko that he (RUSSIAN OFFICIAL) was getting tired of doing what he wasn’t really supposed to be doing in his job - **\*\*\*\*** - and that he (RUSSIAN OFFICIAL) didn’t want Russia exposed in the US election. It was Danchenko’s understanding that RUSSIAN OFFICIAL was moving back to Russia and hoped for an **\*\*\*\***.

(U//FOUO) As an aside while talking about RUSSIAN official, Danchenko explained that since his time at **\*\*\*\***, he has maintained distance from diplomats at the Russian Embassy. He and USPER had contact with a **\*\*\*\*** secretary at the Embassy – a strange guy who was pestering them. They gave this individual open source information. Danchenko identified this individual as RUSSIAN official, **\*\*\*\*** Danchenko knew about **\*\*\*\*** while Danchenko was working at **\*\*\*\***. RUSSIAN official asked for information about Ukraine and the Orange Revolution, and USPER recommended

that they keep him at a distance. Danchenko did talk to RUSSIAN official – he related to the interviewers that RUSSIAN official **\*\*\*\***. [This is how, explained Danchenko, he picked up information about how the **\*\*\*\***.] RUSSIAN official had to travel to **\*\*\*\*** - sometimes driving and sometimes flying – to deliver cash **\*\*\*\***. RUSSIAN official completely dropped off the map sometime around 2007-2008.

(U//FOUO) Looking at Report 2016/111, Danchenko was asked about the report’s use of the descriptor, “a trusted compatriot.” – as in paragraph one, “Speaking in confidence to a trusted compatriot in mid-September 2016…” Danchenko was asked if he was the “trusted compatriot” in these reports. Danchenko said that it might be him, but that it could also be others. Danchenko’s attorney then jumped in, stating that the “literary device” used by Steele in the dossier was not consistent and not clear, so he wanted to be careful about matching that descriptor to his client. Danchenko said that, to the best of his knowledge, he is not sure if he was the only one working on this issue for Orbis [and therefore he is not clear if he is always the “trusted compatriot” mentioned in the documents].

(U//FOUO) Interviewers drew Danchenko’s attention to paragraph 5 of the same report, where Mikhail Kalugin [written as Kulagin] is mentioned. Danchenko is not clear how this paragraph was put together. Danchenko indicated that no MFA official told him **\*\*\*\*** because of the election issue. About **\*\*\*\*** Danchenko knows that **\*\*\*\*** Danchenko that **\*\*\*\***. Kalugin had described Bondarev as

“a bright young guy.” Danchenko has no idea where the language in this paragraph regarding **\*\*\*\*** being “clean in this regard” (with respect to knowledge and involvement in US election matters **\*\*\*\***).

1. **Dossier Report 2016/94**

(U//FOUO) Regarding Paragraphs 1 and 2, interviewers went back over Danchenko’s explanations from the previous day, particularly the issue of whether Danchenko had heard from SOURCE 5 that the Page-Sechin meeting was going to happen, that it had happened, or both. Danchenko explained that he didn’t recall who had told him that the meeting was going to happen – it might have been through SOURCE 5, but the more he thought, the more he thought it was from someone else, and he couldn’t recall who. He reported the meeting to Steele in July, and then, in October, he received SOURCE 5’s text with the confirming information from someone **\*\*\*\***. Danchenko does not know the identity **\*\*\*\*** executive.

(U//FOUO) Regarding Paragraph 3 on Carter Page’s meeting with Igor Divyekin, Danchenko said that this information came from SOURCE 3. Danchenko and SOURCE 3 had a phone conversation, or maybe Skype, but Danchenko remembers that it was a voice communication which lasted about 30 minutes. Danchenko said it was during the summer, because he remembers having the conversation while was at the public swimming pool **\*\*\*\*** and “whatever” with **\*\*\*\***. SOURCE 3 was relating information that she was hearing from her sources – Danchenko did not ask her about the identities of these sources. Danchenko could probably follow-up with SOURCE 3 about the sources, but he explained that he has no reason to doubt SOURCE 3. He trusts SOURCE 3.

(U//FOUO) On the Divyekin identification, this was the name her sources gave her. He was in the Domestic Policy section entity and was one of the people in charge of US-Russia relations [*ANALYST NOTE: Danchenko’s description was unclear here, because he added, “election-related stuff,” but then went back referring to it as “US-Russia relations*.”] SOURCE 3 suggested that there was an attempt to masquerade things or craft a façade because “the folks who were in domestic policy were working external [foreign] policy, while the folks doing external were working domestic matters.”

(U//FOUO) Danchenko explained that, on the whole, his conversations with SOURCE 3 were done in an opaque way, so as to be careful security-wise. SOURCE 3 and Danchenko knew that when they talked, they were talking about the US election issue, but wouldn’t necessarily refer to it.

(U//FOUO) **\*\*\*\*** is the one who told Danchenko that the Russian government was sitting on “kompromat” as stated in paragraph 4.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko’s attorney stated that it was his client’s assessment that this information from SOURCE 3 was credible and accurate. It is Danchenko’s conclusion that the information in paragraph 3 came from his conversation with SOURCE 3.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko is “inconclusive” about where exactly the information in paragraph 4 came from. He thinks he and SOURCE 3 may have spoken about it – SOURCE 3 is tied to both **\*\*\*\*** and Ivanov – but he would not have described SOURCE 3 as “an official close to Ivanov.” When asked by interviewers how he (Danchenko) described SOURCE 3 to

Christopher Steele, Danchenko said that he described her as “my friend who knows someone in the Kremlin with direct/indirect access to Sergey Ivanov.”

1. **Dossier Report 2016/134**

(U//FOUO) The information in the first paragraph of this report came from Danchenko’s text interchange with SOURCE 5 in October 2016.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko was less conclusive about the construction of paragraph 2. The final sentence about the lifting of sanctions was taken from SOURCE 5’s text in October, but SOURCE 5 never mentioned to Danchenko that Page had been offered any brokerage of the 19% Rosneft stake. There were speculations and “open secrets” about Rosneft and foreign offerings. For example, **\*\*\*\*** an energy analyst and professor [*ANALYST NOTE: This appears to be identical to* ***\*\*\*\**** *who as of* ***\*\*\*\**** *was the* ***\*\*\*\**** *of Russia’s* **\*\*\*\***] suggested in broad terms to Danchenko in **\*\*\*\*** during the **\*\*\*\*** that once sanctions were lifted, Rosneft could find itself in a “privileged” state. As an aside, Danchenko remarked that **\*\*\*\*** is often dismissed intrinsically as being a Gazprom lobbyist.

1. **Michael Cohen, Prague and Dossier Reports 2016/135, 2016/136, and 2016/166**

(U//FOUO) Danchenko began his explanation of the Prague and Michael Cohen-related reports by stating that Christopher Steele had given him 4-5 names to research for the election-related tasking. He could only remember three of the names: Carter Page, Paul Manafort and Michael Cohen. When he talked to SOURCE 3 in the fall of 2016 – he believes

it was a phone call – he rattled off these names and, out of them, he was surprised to hear that SOURCE 3 immediately [later Danchenko softened this to “almost immediately”] recognized Cohen’s name.

I(U//FOUO) In Report 2016/135, Danchenko did not know the origins of paragraph 1. He said that it didn’t come from him, and that he doesn’t know where the information is from. He described it as “too general.”

(U//FOUO) In paragraph 2 of the same report (2016/135), Danchenko recognized material from his conversations with SOURCE 3 in the middle of the paragraph. SOURCE 3 had told Danchenko that Cohen and three other unidentified people had flown [or, as Danchenko put it later, “assumed they had flown”] into Prague in August-September 2016 and had met with a group from Russia. Danchenko asked her who else besides Cohen had come into Prague from the US side – she didn’t know, but she was willing to go back and find out. She never got back to him about this. Danchenko also asked about the participants on the Russian side. She didn’t know, but she indicated that her “best guess” or “her understanding” was that they were from “Legal Affairs” or “Legal Department.” Danchenko indicated that SOURCE 3 did not say why she thought that. Danchenko wasn’t aware that such an entity existed – he was not able to find it through research.

(U//FOUO) Reflecting on the Prague-related material, Danchenko believes he had 2, maybe even 3, conversations with SOURCE 3 on this topic later in October. Nothing on Prague and Cohen was collected during the **\*\*\*\*** trip in **\*\*\*\***. The first conversation is the one during which he believes SOURCE 3 noted her recognition of Cohen’s name. The second conversation is the one in which she discussed Prague, the visit of Cohen plus three other individuals,

and the meeting with the Russian side. There may have been a third conversation on the topic, but Danchenko could not recall exactly and said that they had also talked about “a private subject.”

(U//FOUO) In paragraph 2, Danchenko doesn’t believe he discussed Paul Manafort with SOURCE 3. SOURCE 3 didn’t bring up Carter Page or Manafort during these October conversations. The direct quote “…to sweep it all under the carpet…” is from SOURCE 3. SOURCE 3 did not say, however, why Cohen went to Prague instead of Carter Page.

(U//FOUO) In Dossier Report 2016/166, SOURCE 3 is the one who provided the Rossotrudnichestvo information and the identification of **\*\*\*\***. Danchenko said that during either the second or third conversation with SOURCE 3 about the Cohen matter, SOURCE 3 had initially thought the meetings involved the “legal department” but then identified **\*\*\*\*** and Rossotrudnichestvo. Danchenko kept pushing SOURCE 3 for information about the identities of the US participants, but she did not know. On the Russian side, Danchenko requested that she go back to her sources, and it was after that she came back with the identification of **\*\*\*\***. However, Danchenko said that SOURCE 3 never mentioned or said that **\*\*\*\*** was working “under Rossotrudnichestvo cover,” as is stated in the report. Danchenko had done his own research and confirmed that **\*\*\*\*** existed.

(U//FOUO) In the same report, SOURCE 3 is the one who mentioned “deniable cash payments” and “wires.” Danchenko pushed SOURCE 3 for the substance of the meeting in Prague, but he is not sure if SOURCE 3 was brainstorming here, or if she is relating information from her sources.

(U//FOUO) As an aside here, Danchenko spoke about some personal details regarding SOURCE 3. **\*\*\*\***. **\*\*\*\***

**\*\*\*\*** Danchenko reiterated a story from the previous day – SOURCE 3 had just reached out to him the other day to ask him to **\*\*\*\*** an article about Russian speakers and Trump. **\*\*\*\*** currently has a visa to come to the United States. To questions posed by FBI SA Somma and comments made by his attorney, Danchenko indicated that he could carefully **\*\*\*\*** SOURCE 3, perhaps even meet her in a third country. To try and get additional information of interest to the FBI would require in-person conversation, and Danchenko quipped that he’s never been **\*\*\*\***. Danchenko said that he had plans to visit her earlier this year **\*\*\*\***, but that it didn’t work out. Danchenko said that she knew that he had plans to visit her in **\*\*\*\***, because the two of them had talked through the plans. When asked if SOURCE 3 would be comfortable talking to the FBI, Danchenko said that he wasn’t sure.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko summarized that, when it comes to the dossier, the Page material regarding Sechin came from SOURCE 5, while the Cohen/Prague material came from SOURCE 3.

(U//FOUO) In paragraph 3 of Report 2016/166, Danchenko said that he believes that the material “strongly corresponds” to a recent, December 2016 conversation that he had with SOURCE 3. This was a separate, follow-on conversation to the October conversations mentioned before. The material is not word-for-word from his conversation with SOURCE 3, but partially-based on their December 2016 telephone conversation. For example, in their conversation, while he doesn’t remember her saying **\*\*\*\*** he does recall her saying **\*\*\*\***. He recalls that she talked

about **\*\*\*\*** “affiliates” but she did not mention the Democratic Party in the way that the report says. As he mentioned earlier, he stated that their conversations were held in the overall context of the US elections and hacking, but he is not sure if she mentioned a specific political party or candidate at this time. She did mention “porn traffic” as mentioned in this paragraph. Danchenko does not recall SOURCE 3’s reference to a specific time frame of March through September 2016.

(U//FOUO) SOURCE 3 did mention both **\*\*\*\*** who she mentioned – as stated in the report – work “under the FSB.” She mentioned **\*\*\*\*** and all of his smaller subsidiaries and companies. Danchenko said that SOURCE 3 **\*\*\*\***, which Danchenko said was one of **\*\*\*\*** companies. Danchenko admitted to the interviewers that his understanding of this topic (i.e. cyber) was “zero” and that SOURCE 3 is not an IT specialist herself. SOURCE 3 never said that **\*\*\*\*** was involved in any of this. He said that paragraph 3 has references and keywords involving payments and cover-up from his conversation with SOURCE 3.

(U//FOUO) With respect to paragraph 4, SOURCE 3 gave this as a kind of example. She didn’t offer any specific information or evidence, but that this (e.g. Romanian hackers heading to Bulgaria to lay low) is a kind of example [*ANALYST NOTE: It seemed by Danchenko’s description that this might be SOURCE 3’s analysis*]. Danchenko is not sure where the term “bolt hole” is from, and tried, unsuccessfully, to think about what Russian term this might be representing. When asked if everything in this paragraph came from SOURCE 3, Danchenko said that it was difficult to say with certainty. It sounds like material that SOURCE 3 would say. Looking back through this paragraph, Danchenko said that

everything before the term “lay low” is definitely SOURCE 3 while he is not sure about everything after that term. Danchenko is not sure about the specifics in this paragraph and agreed with interviewers that the report has more specific language (place names; ethnicity of hackers) than other reports. Interviewers brought up the fact that Danchenko had mentioned the previous day that SOURCE 3 spoke **\*\*\*\*** and had a family vacation home **\*\*\*\***. Danchenko did not know if the family home was in **\*\*\*\***, but asked if **\*\*\*\*** was “on the coast” because that’s where typical family vacation homes were located.

1. **SOURCE 6, RIA Novosti, and Dossier Report 2016/95**

(U//FOUO) Danchenko was asked to go back over the reports discussed in brief the previous day regarding his interaction with SOURCE 6. Danchenko said that Christopher Steele had asked him to find sources linked to the Trump team, who could answer the overarching questions regarding Russia’s connections to the team, etc. Danchenko turned to his contacts at **\*\*\*\***, and his contacts there told him (Danchenko) that there was “this guy, SOURCE 6” that he (Danchenko) should talk to.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko first met in person with USPER, **\*\*\*\***, who is still around (as Danchenko understands) and who is one of Danchenko’s **\*\*\*\***. Danchenko said that USPER has offices **\*\*\*\***, and the two of them met over lunch at a Thai restaurant. He didn’t want to ask USPER very targeted or revealing questions for the election assignment, so he kept them broad in scope (“Do you **\*\*\*\*** know anyone who talk about all of this Trump/Manafort stuff, or Trump and Russia?”) USPER commented about how there was a great

amount of speculation about Russian influence and Russian ties, but that he was skeptical and nothing substantive had turned up. USPER said Danchenko should also speak with his **\*\*\*\*** colleague, USPER 2. USPER said that “there [is] this guy USPER 2 interviewed and he (USPER 2) could probably get his contact information.” Danchenko said he believes that, in the end, USPER gave him (Danchenko) SOURCE 6’s email, and that he (Danchenko) never met with USPER 2. [Danchenko added that he will see if he still has the email]

(U//FOUO) Danchenko emailed SOURCE 6 in either June or July 2016 – but it was after Danchenko’s trip **\*\*\*\***. Danchenko did not receive a response from this email, but says that it was at that point that “things got strange.” In July 2016, he received a telephone call from an unidentified Russian guy. He thought it was SOURCE 6 – he still thinks it was SOURCE 6 – but the individual never identified himself as SOURCE 6. They talked for about 10 minutes, and then arranged to meet together up US CITY.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko remembered that they made plans to meet US CITY, and that Danchenko offered to come up “anytime” SOURCE 6 was available. SOURCE 6 wouldn’t commit to a specific time, but Danchenko said that he could be US CITY “for a couple of days.” Danchenko could not recall if SOURCE 6 said he lived US CITY or not, but Danchenko guessed that he did. Following this, Danchenko - **\*\*\*\*** - traveled US CITY with prepared questions, but SOURCE 6 was a no-show. The visit would have been near the end of July. Later, Danchenko spoke with USPER 2, who mentioned to Danchenko that SOURCE 6 had been asking about him (Danchenko). USPER 2 said that SOURCE 6 had asked him (USPER 2) “who the hell you (Danchenko) were” and that it would be

hard to reach out to him (SOURCE 6) now because he was in **\*\*\*\***. Danchenko remembers providing Christopher Steele with the information about SOURCE 6’s whereabouts in **\*\*\*\***.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko tried one more follow-up with SOURCE 6 in September 2016. He decided to use his friend from **\*\*\*\***, who is involved in **\*\*\*\***. She has a **\*\*\*\*** project, so, knowing that SOURCE 6 **\*\*\*\***, Danchenko sent him a brochure about **\*\*\*\*** project in the hope that it would generate a response. SOURCE 6 never responded. At some point, SOURCE 6 and Danchenko became **\*\*\*\***, but Danchenko could not remember which of them initiated the **\*\*\*\***.

(U//FOUO) Altogether, Danchenko and the person he believed – and still believes – to be SOURCE 6 had one 10-15 minute conversation. Danchenko says that “Source E” in Report 2016/95 sounds like it is from this conversation. During the phone call, he remembers mentioning Manafort and Page. Danchenko recalls that this 10-15 minute conversation included a general discussion about Trump and the Kremlin, that there was “communication” between the parties, and that it was an ongoing relationship. Danchenko recalls that the individual believed to be SOURCE 6 said that there was “exchange of information” between Trump and the Kremlin, and that there was “nothing bad about it.” SOURCE 6 said that some of this information exchange could be good for Russia, and some could be damaging to Trump, but deniable. The individul said that the Kremlin might be of help to get Trump elected, but Danchenko did not recall any discussion of Wikileaks.

(U//FOUO) Besides the 10-15 minute conversation, Danchenko had no further contact with SOURCE 6 (or the person he believed to be SOURCE 6).

1. **Trump, the Ritz Carlton and Dossier Report 2016/80**

(U//FOUO) The interviewers brought Danchenko’s attention to the report regarding Trump’s alleged unorthodox sexual activity at the Ritz Carlton Hotel – specifically paragrph 3 of Report 2016/80. Danchenko said that this information came, partially, from SOURCE 2. SOURCE 2’s circle of associates and friends, Danchenko explained once more, is primarily in the **\*\*\*\*** sphere, but his social network is vast, and he has other, random associates. In fact, as another example, SOURCE 2 travels to **\*\*\*\***.

(U//FOUO) When Danchenko asked SOURCE 2 in early June 2016 (the **\*\*\*\***) about whether he knew of any compromising materials on Trump, SOURCE 2 said that there was a “well known story” about Trump’s activities in the very hotel **\*\*\*\*** - the Ritz Carlton. **\*\*\*\*** to make preparations for the **\*\*\*\*** event. The “well known story” involved the allegation that Trump was “into water sports” and had engaged in that activity “in the presidential suite” at the Ritz Carlton. In terms of whether the story was true, SOURCE 2 explained that people “know” but that it “only becomes fact if people come forward.” SOURCE 2 said that the hotel is bugged, and “heaven only knows” who or what has been filmed by the FSB. SOURCE 2 said to Danchenko **\*\*\*\***. Go and check out the story.” **\*\*\*\***

(U//FOUO) As Danchenko explained it, the fact of hotel bugging and the

use of filmed “kompromat” is not uncommon. Danchenko related the names of those who have been targeted in this way – [Yuriy] Skuratov, [Mikhail] Kasyanov, and Vladimir Rushkov [unclear, maybe Ryzhkov]. Danchenko has also been able to comment on hotel bugging because it is generally known, as he explained to interviewers, that if you want to visit Moscow and not be vulnerable to being bugged, you have to stay away from the Ritz Carlton, the Hotel Moskva, and the Hotel Peking.

(U//FOUO) Regarding paragraph 4 in Report 2016/80, **\*\*\*\***, he had a meeting with the managers **\*\*\*\***. During a free minute, he asked about “this stuff about Trump at the hotel.” His interlocutors laughed it off, stating that “all kinds of things happen at the hotel” and with celebrities, “one never knows what they’re doing.” Danchenko said that it wasn’t a denial. And asking the hotel staff who were assisting with the **\*\*\*\*** arrangements, one girl commented that “anything goes” at the hotel, and added that, “officially, we don’t have prostitutes.”

(U//FOUO) For this story, Christopher Steele was given the names of the management at the Ritz Carlton. Danchenko said that he reported Trump’s unorthodox sexual activity at the Ritz as “rumor and speculation” and that he had not been able to confirm the story.

(U//FOUO) In the same report, paragraphs 1, 4 and 5, Danchenko identified “Source B” as FORMER RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER through SOURCE 1. SOURCE 1 reported that he and FORMER RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER had “had a conversation” about the content in the report. FORMER RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER said that they had “embarrassing stuff – sexual/pornographic material” on a number of folks, including Trump.” Danchenko said that the end of paragraph 4 regarding the

ability to blackmail Trump was “logical conclusion” rather than reporting. The conversation with SOURCE 1 took place in June 2016 at **\*\*\*\*** – the particular café near the **\*\*\*\***. Danchenko remarked that RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER insists on having meetings in **\*\*\*\*** himself]. Danchenko said that the mention of the file in paragraph 5 was part of a conversation between FORMER RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER and SOURCE 1, but Danchenko has no idea where the mention of “Department K of the FSB” is from. He does not recall hearing that, or mentioning that to Christopher Steele. Additionally, the years over which the “kompromat” file was collected were also never mentioned, to Danchenko’s recollection.

**26 January 2017**

**FBI Washington Field Office Interview Room**

**Present:**

**Igor Danchenko, interviewee**

**\*\*\*\*, interviewee’s attorney**

**\*\*\*\*, FBI Special Agent Somma**

**\*\*\*\*, FBI Supervisory Intelligence Analyst Auten**

**\*\*\*\*, Deputy, National Security Division, US Department of Justice**

1. **Recent Communication by Orbis Representative; Overall Wellbeing**

(U//FOUO) Danchenko and his attorney related that Chris Steele had signaled” to Danchenko this morning. One of Steele’s associates at Orbis, **\*\*\*\*** - an analyst who Danchenko said he has seen approximately 12 times – called Danchenko. **\*\*\*\*** remarked that Danchenko “had been lying too low.” **\*\*\*\*** said that “[Orbis] hadn’t heard from him over the past 10 days, and that they wanted to know what was going on.” Danchenko told **\*\*\*\*** that he’d been staying in a hotel and at his **\*\*\*\*** place **\*\*\*\***, and that he had been talking to an attorney about his **\*\*\*\***.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko did not speak with Steele during this conversation. Danchenko heard from **\*\*\*\*** that Steele was still “lying low” but that “everyone” was concerned about Danchenko’s wellbeing. [*ANALYST NOTE: The attorney commented that the fact* ***\*\*\*\**** *reached out is yet another indication of how his client was put through the recruitment cycle – initially recruited by Chris Steele, but passed off to underlings for day-to-day management*.] **\*\*\*\*** and Danchenko discussed some possible future assignments – “small due diligence assignments unrelated to politics” – and **\*\*\*\*** indicated that they would run stuff by him if something came up – but [and it was not clear if this was **\*\*\*\*** actual comment or Danchenko’s reflection] probably not much in the area of Russia. There was talk about wiring past due monies for Danchenko to **\*\*\*\***. Or, Danchenko added, there was also discussion about getting him money through someone we know [in the United States]”. Danchenko was hesitant about arranging payments in any way that “looked strange.”

(U//FOUO) **\*\*\*\*** told Danchenko that since the Buzzfeed story hit the news, Orbis had received 20,000 emails.

(U//FOUO) No one from **\*\*\*\*** has reached out to check on Danchenko’s welfare. That said, Danchenko typically works from his home. He works off-hours, given the time difference between Moscow and London. There is space and some desks he can use at **\*\*\*\***, but most of his work is done at home.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko commented that, unless his name goes public, he is fine when it comes to his source network. He doesn’t believe he can travel **\*\*\*\*** - he feels that he would be in danger and, as he put it, **\*\*\*\***.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko indicated that Orbis does know the identities of some of his sources – they have some first and last names. For example, Orbis knows the identity of SOURCE 2, who, Danchenko added, **\*\*\*\***.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko said that he had gone back to check for electronic communication records, but he said that he had deleted most of the election-related communications “months ago.” He also has a different phone from the one he used previously. He didn’t delete communication involving USPER 2 [see previous day’s interview], and he had reported that communication to Christopher Steele.

(U//FOUO) **Dossier Report 2016/86**

(U//FOUO) Danchenko was asked a number of questions regarding the sourcing and information about the FSB cyber-related dossier report.

(U//FOUO) In paragraph 1, the “former senior intelligence officer” is FORMER RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, through SOURCE 1. SOURCE 1 told this information directly to Danchenko in **\*\*\*\*** at the **\*\*\*\***

cafe.

(U//FOUO) Some of the material in paragraph 2 was not familiar to Danchenko. In general, the material tracks with comments made to Danchenko by SOURCE 2, with corroboration via open source material. Looking more over the paragraph, Danchenko said that the SOURCE 2 material begins with the sentence, “To compensate for this shortfall…” Danchenko does not recall using the term “first tier” (in the first sentence) in his reports to Steele – he is not sure that information came from him (Danchenko).

(U//FOUO) The material in paragraph 3 could be referencing material gleaned from one of Danchenko’s **\*\*\*\*** friends from **\*\*\*\***, FRIEND. When he was **\*\*\*\*** years old, FRIEND was caught “facilitating payments for a pornographic website.” He was offered a deal – cooperate with the FSB or potentially go to jail. He ended up doing some work for the FSB, but Danchenko doesn’t know what type of work FRIEND did for the FSB [*ANALYST NOTE: This is in contradiction to Danchenko’s statement the first day, at which time he indicated that he did not have any contacts associated with the Russian intelligence and security services*.] FRIEND is a couple of years younger than Danchenko, and he (FRIEND) returned to “normal life” [that is, post FSB activity] around **\*\*\*\***. FRIEND told Danchenko that he knew of many other people who have been put in a similar situation [with the FSB]. Presently, FRIEND works in **\*\*\*\***; however, Danchenko is unclear for whom – he (Danchenko) thought that FRIEND might be working for **\*\*\*\***, for the banking industry, and/or doing something in the way of **\*\*\*\***. When asked if Danchenko would consider FRIEND a “contractor,” Danchenko said “yes, like myself, but in a different [sector].”

(U//FOUO) In the same paragraph – paragraph 3 – the portion that begins with “In one case a US citizen…” was derived from a conversation with SOURCE 1. SOURCE 1 related this story, indicating that the US citizen was SOURCE 1’s friend who does work with “educational apps or something.”

(U//FOUO) For paragraph 4, Danchenko could not attribute it to any source in particular. The “foreign director of a company,” recalled Danchenko, is a foreign director on the board of **\*\*\*\***, but he did not know the exact identity.

(U//FOUO) For paragraph 5, Danchenko said that some of the information came from his discussion with the Russian **\*\*\*\***, RUSSIAN CONTACT – who, Danchenko reiterated, **\*\*\*\*** [**\*\*\*\***.] Danchenko said that “an FSB cyber operative” is an incorrect source characterization and that RUSSIAN CONTACT had mentioned to him (Danchenko) that Telegram had been compromised.

(U//FOUO) Regarding paragraph 6, Danchenko could not attribute it conclusively to any particular source. He said that he can’t confirm it, but he believes the source may have been SOURCE 2. Some of it is open source, however.

(U//FOUO) **General Summarizing about Danchenko’s Sources**

(U//FOUO) The interviewers asked Danchenko if, generally speaking about the dossier as a whole, the mentions of Dmitriy Peskov [Putin’s press secretary] and Sergey Ivanov can be typically sourced to SOURCE 3. Danchenko said yes – SOURCE 3 has direct and indirect contact with a deputy, or multiple deputies, in **\*\*\*\***. As stated earlier,

she is also tied into **\*\*\*\***. Danchenko said that, through SOURCE 3, he could try and get the names and the deputies and assistants she uses for getting her information.

(U//FOUO) When it comes to any material on **\*\*\*\*** SOURCE 2 is the primary source. SOURCE 2 is friends with RUSSIAN official. Danchenko related a story from circa 2015-2016. For a different assignment, Danchenko got SOURCE 2 to talk to the **\*\*\*\***. During that interaction, the **\*\*\*\*** indicated that power and authority when it came to press relations had centralized on Peskov. SOURCE 2’s friend indicated that “[we’re] all under Peskov now,” which Danchenko took to mean that authority within the Presidential Administration’s PR/GR circles had entered a pyramid-type stage with Peskov at the top of the pyramid.

(U//FOUO) On the material regarding the replacement of Sergei Ivanov with Anton Vaino, this was aso derived from SOURCE 3, as well as “two other friends: [which Danchenko left vague and didn’t identify]. The part of the reports connecting Ivanov’s replacement to the fallout over Russia’s influence efforts against the US election was, according to Danchenko, his analytical conclusion. SOURCE 3 “confirmed that it had to be true,” said Danchenko. SOURCE 3 told him something like “[Ivanov’s dismissal because of US-election related fallout] just had to be true” or else she said something like “Of course, it has to be that…”

(U//FOUO) **General Summarizing of Danchenko’s Debriefings by Orbis**

(U//FOUO) The interviewers asked Danchenko about how Christopher Steele would go about debriefing him after his visits, specifically about how

Steele asked him about distinguishing between what his sources have told him versus his (Danchenko’s) analytical judgements. Danchenko said that Steele would often ask him, “Are you sure [about what your source is telling you],” and sometimes would repeatedly press him about a certain report – emphasizing “Are you (Danchenko) sure? Are you sure?” Danchenko said that he (Danchenko) was very careful about caveating during debriefs with Steele. He would tell Steele if something was his analytical judgement (“As an analyst, I think…”), explain his confidence levels (“It is possible vs. likely” or “It is plausible”), and even tell Steele whether something had just not been explicitly denied (“No one has denied it when I’ve brought it up.”) At times he would tell Steele that “I’ve told you what I know.” When pressed by Steele to try to get additional information, Danchenko would explain that he did not want to go back to his friends “3 or 4 times” to try to get additional material – it would look bad and it would raise suspicions. Steele might ask, for example, “Do any of your (Danchenko’s) sources know if Ivanov was sacked because of the US presidential election?”

(U//FOUO) Not wanting to cause suspicions with friends and associates, Danchenko would try and corroborate the reporting he (Danchenko) received in other ways. The interviewers also asked if Danchenko would characterize his sources to Steele (“SOURCE 3 told me X” or “SOURCE 1 told me Y”). Danchenko said that was not always the case.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko said that his verbal debriefings with Christopher Steele were held at Orbis’ office, not at hotels. Steele would debrief Danchenko solo, and would take handwritten notes of what Danchenko was telling him. Danchenko remarked that it [Steele taking handwritten notes] was just like “you [the FBI interviewers] are doing today.”

(U//FOUO) Going back over his note-taking, Danchenko said that he would not really write detailed notes about his source meetings. Even on the **\*\*\*\*** flight, returning from trips, he might scratch out a few tentative points – i.e. “5 days, 17 meetings” – and maybe some cryptic reminders. He might even write a text message to himself, but he compared it to preparation to a conference panel presentation – a few notes jotted on a notecard before one heads to the panel. He told the interviewers that he had destroyed any of these scribbled notes.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko was asked how Steele tasked him – by email, Skype or phone. Danchenko said it was a combination of these things. Danchenko described the US election-related tasking came in three waves: (1) the initial tasking about Paul Manafort; (2) the tasking about any compromising materials on Donald Trump; (3) tasking about Sergey Ivanov’s involvement in the US election; and (4) later on, in the fall of 2016, 4-5 names to ask about [which Danchenko talked about earlier, including Carter Page and Michael Cohen].

(U//FOUO) Danchenko was asked if Steele had ever mentioned going to the press with the election-related information. To Danchenko’s knowledge, Steele never went to the press about this material. Danchenko never heard Steele voice anything suggesting that this material needed to get into the hands of the press.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko was asked if he was tasked with anything else similar to what was in the dossier, but does not appear in the dossier. He said no, and repeated that these types of taskings [on the election matter] made him uncomfortable. Steele pushed Danchenko to try and either follow-up with people or corroborate the reporting, but Danchenko wasn’t able to do so. Moreover, Danchenko added, attempts at

getting corroboration on these subjects made him uncomfortable – he was very nervous about the Russians finding out about it.

(U//FOUO) The interviwers later asked Danchenko to review his annotated version of the dossier, asking specifically if there were any additional source names that had not been covered in the 3-day interview. Danchenko said that there were no other source names.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko said that he did not have any UK-based friends or social network connections from whom he collects information.

(U//FOUO) **More Information about Danchenko’s Trips \*\*\*\***

(U//FOUO) Danchenko talked about his **\*\*\*\*** trips **\*\*\*\*** - **\*\*\*\***. Danchenko also had a trip to **\*\*\*\*** in **\*\*\*\*** 2016.

(U//FOUO) **\*\*\*\* 2016**

(U//FOUO) The **\*\*\*\*** 2016 trip was completely paid by Orbis.

(U//FOUO) **\*\*\*\* 2016**

(U//FOUO) He remarked that the **\*\*\*\*** trip was “odd,” explaining that, upon entry, he was interviewed more pointedly than usual. This was the only time it has happened. For about five minutes, he was peppered with questions and statements like, “What exactly are you planning to do here? Who are you visiting” Your photo looks different.” Danchenko kept his answers vague – he said he was visiting his **\*\*\*\***. All the while, his questioners at entry were checking on the computer. He reported this incident to Steele.

(U//FOUO) Going back over the **\*\*\*\*** trip, the interviewers asked if he made it up to **\*\*\*\***, particularly since some of the material in the dossier mentions **\*\*\*\***. He did travel to **\*\*\*\***. He went for a “private weekend” to **\*\*\*\*** that had nothing to do with work. He flew **\*\*\*\*** from **\*\*\*\***. Danchenko said that none of the material in the dossier was derived from his weekend trip to **\*\*\*\***.

(U//FOUO) The **\*\*\*\*** trip was completely paid by Orbis.

(U//FOUO) **\*\*\*\* 2016**

(U//FOUO) What alarmed Danchenko most about his **\*\*\*\*** 2016 visit was “how perfectly it all went.” Nothing bad happened. There were a number of events for which he was the facilitator. He had to make sure people were where they were supposed to be, and he also gave a **\*\*\*\***. **\*\*\*\*** , but it went off without a hitch.

(U//FOUO) During the **\*\*\*\*** trip, **\*\*\*\*** gave a brief presentation to the delegation **\*\*\*\*** was one of 3-4 speakers during a set of talks **\*\*\*\***. **\*\*\*\*** is the only person during this trip whose name made it into the dossier; however, the material on **\*\*\*\*** was not derived from the **\*\*\*\*** trip. Danchenko did not spend any time with **\*\*\*\*** during the **\*\*\*\*** trip. Danchenko said that he saw SOURCE 4, SOURCE 2, and “**\*\*\*\***.” Danchenko did not collect anything on the **\*\*\*\*** trip.

(U//FOUO) Steele debriefed Danchenko after the **\*\*\*\*** trip. Nothing specific was provided; he and Steele just had “ongoing conversations” about the general situation. Orbis contributed to the costs of the **\*\*\*\*** trip, but the trip was paid for by **\*\*\*\***. It was during this layover period in London that Danchenko received the text confirming Page’s meeting with Sechin.

(U//FOUO) **\*\*\*\* 2016**

(U//FOUO) Danchenko traveled to the UK at the end of **\*\*\*\*** 2016. The trip was jointly financed by Orbis and Danchenko himself. He met with Steele, but most of the rest of Orbis was on a retreat in Dublin. He and Steele went out, had a glass of champagne, and had only general conversations. There was no discussion of the election, and no discussion of the election-related project.

(U//FOUO) **St. Petersburg & Dossier Report 2016/112**

(U//FOUO) Danchenko explained that the overall subject of this report – Govorun, Alfa Bank – has been a topic he (Danchenko) has been working for over ten years. It hearkens back to his time **\*\*\*\*** with USPER, where they would hypothesize about relationships between Russian corruption and the Alfa Fellowship.

(U//FOUO) As an aside, Danchenko told another corruption-related story wherein SOURCE 1 told Danchenko that [someone had told him] about how Marat Bashirov, who had been head of the Lugansk People’s Republic )LPR) and has been sanctioned by the EU, left the LPR after 5-6 months to become a top lobbyist for Renova Group – specifically Renova’s arm dealing with heating and power distribution. Bashirov is a Moscow-based lobbyist who is working to get the EU sanctions lifted.

(U//FOUO) **St. Petersburg-Related Information**

(U//FOUO) The material regarding St. Petersburg and Trump real estate deals came from SOURCE 2. SOURCE 2 suggested that one person to look at regarding compromising material on Trump was [Aras] Agalarov, as well as **\*\*\*\***, one of the biggest real estate developers.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko also talked to a friend of his who [*ANALYST NOTE: either had or knew someone who had*] escorted Trump while in St. Petersburg. FRIEND, who he knew as a **\*\*\*\*** in **\*\*\*\***, was a **\*\*\*\*** who lived in Moscow. She was about **\*\*\*\*** years old when she died, suddenly, last **\*\*\*\***. Danchenko heard the bad news from her boyfriend, who sent him a picture of her gravesite. She wrote stories which were on the critical side of the Russian government. **\*\*\*\***. He saw her in Russia during a project circa **\*\*\*\*** 2013 **\*\*\*\*** adding that it was about 6-7 months before the Olympics. He also saw her **\*\*\*\*** in **\*\*\*\*** 2015 at a get-together **\*\*\*\***. He said she was also **\*\*\*\***. **\*\*\*\***.

(U//FOUO) **Reactions of Danchenko’s Friends to the Dossier**

(U//FOUO) Danchenko has had friends reach out to him about Trump and the dossier. He’s considered it normal joking – **\*\*\*\***

**\*\*\*\***. He simply jokes back. None of his friends or social network has broken off contact because of the election or the release of the dossier.

(U//FOUO) **Friends’ Travel to the United States; Approachability**

(U//FOUO) **SOURCE 3**

(U//FOUO) Danchenko was asked if he’d ever met SOURCE 3 in the United States. Danchenko said that he met SOURCE 3 in the United States during her visit in **\*\*\*\*** 2016. She had a trip to a number of destinations in the United States, and she stopped over in **\*\*\*\***. She, Danchenko, and **\*\*\*\***, went shopping and to a restaurant together. Danchenko said that she came out for her **\*\*\*\***. He doesn’t know exactly where she visited while in the United States, but he thought it was **\*\*\*\***.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko believes that SOURCE 3 had also traveled previously to the United States – perhaps as many as **\*\*\*\*** times. He knows that she was on a **\*\*\*\*** visiting **\*\*\*\*** in the mid-2000s. She has stayed at hotels as well as at **\*\*\*\*** Danchenko’s place.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko is not sure if SOURCE 3 would talk to the FBI. He can’t speak for her. He said that she is in a **\*\*\*\*** right now [**\*\*\*\***]. Danchenko thinks if SOURCE 3 received a plausible job offer, she might come over. Danchenko offered that he would carefully inquire about her plans over the coming year (2017) and see if there are possibilities – he reiterated that he owes SOURCE 3 an **\*\*\*\*** over the next few days about the views of Russian speakers in the United States towards Trump.

(U//FOUO) **SOURCE 4**

(U//FOUO) SOURCE 4 has not been to the United States in probably **\*\*\*\*** years.

(U//FOUO) **SOURCE 1**

(U//FOUO) SOURCE 1 traveled to the United States in circa **\*\*\*\*** - not long after **\*\*\*\***. Danchenko met him in the United States/ Danchenko reiterated SOURCE 1’s ties with FORMER RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

(U//FOUO) **SOURCE 5**

(U//FOUO) SOURCE 5 has occasional travel to Europe and Southeast Asia **\*\*\*\***. She would probably be willing to travel to the United States; however, Danchenko reiterated that she reportedly has “senior connections” in **\*\*\*\*** and **\*\*\*\***. Off-handedly, Danchenko said that SOURCE 5 has her own “kurator” [handler] but when interviewers pressed him on this point, he softened that statement, indicating that SOURCE 5 “projects an image that she has these types of [secret] connections and “knows the intelligence lingo.” He never reported to Steele that SOURCE 5 had a “kurator.”

(U//FOUO) **Danchenko’s Contacts with Russian Intelligence and Security Services [Redux]; Danchenko and \*\*\*\***

(U//FOUO) Given his language ability and his overseas travel as an **\*\*\*\*** student, Danchenko was asked if he had ever been approached by Russian intelligence and/or security services when he was a student in **\*\*\*\***. Danchenko said no. The only individuals with whom he has contact who were connected to Russia’s intelligence and security services were

(1)his friend, FRIEND, who worked for the FSB in order to stay out of jail **\*\*\*\***, (2) RUSSIAN official, the **\*\*\*\*** in **\*\*\*\*** who mentioned in the previous interview; and (3) FNU RUSSIAN JOURNALIST, who interacted with him and USPER in **\*\*\*\***. RUSSIAN JOURNALIST was the head of **\*\*\*\*** and would pester Danchenko and USPER for information. [*ANALYST NOTE: This contradicted Danchenko’s earlier statements regarding having no contact with Russia’s intelligence and security services, and it also contradicted his earlier statements regarding not really knowing if RUSSIAN official was actually connected to Russia’a intelligence and security services*.]

**\*\*\*\***

**\*\*\*\***

**\*\*\*\***

**\*\*\*\***

(U//FOUO) Danchenko also related a story regarding SOURCE 2’s interaction with the FSB. Danchenko said that he remembered this story “right before I talked to you [the FBI] this week.” Circa **\*\*\*\***, SOURCE 2 was **\*\*\*\***. SOURCE 2 told him (Danchenko) about this, and also **\*\*\*\*** a picture of the doors at **\*\*\*\***. At FSBHQ, SOURCE 2 was questioned **\*\*\*\*** he (SOURCE 2) had made about the leadership of Russia’s **\*\*\*\***. SOURCE 2 was also lightly threatened. According to Danchenko, he (Danchenko) was told that “he (SOURCE 2) should be more careful; that he (SOURCE 2) should watch his mouth and act responsibly.” SOURCE 2 ended up **\*\*\*\*** about his interaction, and received a lot of joking about **\*\*\*\***.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko brushed aside the idea of being approached by the intelligence and security services as a student. He explained that it was the late **\*\*\*\***, and the university setting was rather lax. He did not really attend **\*\*\*\*** class all that often because his language was already good and the classes weren’t that useful. People smoked in class and dressed down.

(U//FOUO) **Danchenko and Russia’s Diplomatic Corps**

(U//FOUO) Danchenko was asked if he had ever considered a career with Russia’s diplomatic corps. Danchenko explained that he went to a **\*\*\*\*** for **\*\*\*\***, which he identified as **\*\*\*\***. Most of the graduates were told, **\*\*\*\***, for example, that they were slated for big things in life and would be aimed towards university at **\*\*\*\***, **\*\*\*\***, or **\*\*\*\***, with future careers in diplomacy, interpretation or “going abroad.” **\*\*\*\*** years later, Danchenko remarked, probably half of the students are abroad, in places like London and elsewhere.

(U//FOUO) Danchenko told the interviewers that he never seriously considered going into the diplomatic corps. He never tested for it, and he never applied for any of the major universities listed above [which would feed into Russia’s diplomatic corps].

(U//FOUO) **Additional Danchenko Contacts from \*\*\*\***

(U//FOUO) Danchenko was asked if – beside SOURCE 3 and others he has mentioned – if he has used other old friendships, schoolmates, and known associates from **\*\*\*\*** as sources of information. Danchenko balked, meandered in the conversation, and did not really answer the question. The interviewers did not press him on this at this point.

(U//FOUO) **Danchenko Contacts in Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)**

(U//FOUO) Danchenko was asked about his contacts in the MFA. He remarked that, over the years, he has collected numerous business cards of MFA personnel, usually through contact at conferences and events. He met Yuriy Ushakov a few times **\*\*\*\*** - and remarked how Ushakov is known to operate “independent” of Lavrov. Danchenko also met Sergey Kislyak at a couple of events – he recalled one event that happened on his **\*\*\*\***.

(U//FOUO) After thinking about it a bit more, Danchenko whispered out loud to himself, “**\*\*\*\***.” The interviewers asked him for additional details. Danchenko could not remember the individual’s surname at first. He said that “**\*\*\*\***” was from **\*\*\*\***, and that he [**\*\*\*\***] was a “strange character” Danchenko met last year. He met **\*\*\*\*** briefly in Moscow. **\*\*\*\*** background was in PR/GR with the **\*\*\*\***. Pavel studied **\*\*\*\***, and then took a career with the MFA. Danchenko described **\*\*\*\*** MFA job as “a delivery boy” but added that it was strange because **\*\*\*\*** “did not seem to be qualified for the job that he had [at the MFA].” Eventually, Danchenko recalled that **\*\*\*\*** surname was [Surname].